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Аннотация 
В статье приведена характеристика проявлений системного риска в банковском 
секторе, в том числе его влияние на деятельность системно значимых банков. Автор 
определяет перечень системно значимых банков Украины несколькими методами. Внесены 
предложения по уменьшению системных рисков и разработке мер по регулированию 
деятельности системно значимых банков. 
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Анотація  
В статті наведено характеристику проявів системного ризику в банківському 
секторі, в тому числі його вплив на діяльність системно значимих банків. Автор визначає 
перелік системно значимих банків України кількома методами. Внесені пропозиції щодо 
зменшення системних ризиків та розробки заходів з регулювання діяльності системно 
значимих банків. 
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Summary 
This article discusses different aspects of the notion of systemic risk in the banking sector, 
including its effect on systemically important banks. The author defines the list of systemically 
important banks in Ukraine for several approaches. The proposals to reduce the systemic risks and 
the development of measures to regulate the activities of systemically important banks are made, 
etc. 
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 Problem setting and its relationship with important scientific and practical 
tasks. In recent years for a significant number of central banks of the world a new 
goal has been set - to ensure the stability of the financial system and to control the 
systemic risk in financial markets. 
 During the crisis the vast majority of countries are trying to "save" their 
greatest, systemically important financial institutions (SIFI). On the amount of money 
allocated to save system you can have an idea of the problems scale of systemically 
important institutions. But the post-crisis period shows that SIFI salvation sometimes 
has a very high, unreasonable price to society and doesn’t always reach the desired 
results (despite significant "infusion" SIFI still bankrupt) and systemic risks remain at 
unacceptably high levels. 
 Recent research and publications analysis. The issue of the systemic risk 
definition has been paying a lot of attention, especially during the recent global crisis. 
Despite numerous publications on the subject the only definition of this term still 
does not exists. The most prominent and common sources are represented in Table 1:  
 
Table 1 – The definition of systemic risk 
The source The definition 
Group 10 Report 
about 
consolidation in 
the financial sector 
(2011)   
Systemic financial risk is a risk that any event will cause a loss of economic 
value of assets or trust in them, causing uncertainty in the financial system 
that will increase to a level at which, quite possibly, it can have a significant 
adverse impact on the real economy. 
George Kaufman 
and Kenneth Scott 
(2003) 
Systemic risk is the risk or probability of damage in the system as a whole in 
contradiction to the destruction of its individual parts and components, and is 
manifested in joint changes (correlation) of the most parts or its elements. In 
the banking sector it is manifested in the high correlation and concentration of 
the crisis situation of banks in one country or group of countries around the 
world. Systemic risk can also occur in other segments of the financial sector - 
in the securities market (simultaneous drop in a large number of securities in 
one or more markets in one country or in many countries), etc. Systemic risk 
can have an internal (national) or international character. 
Alfred Lehar 
(2005) 
Systemic risk is the risk of simultaneous or sequential bankruptcy of several 
financial institutions that leads to the arising of the banking crisis. The 
historical experience of many countries shows that the impact of this crisis on 
the economy can be very significant. During the period of the banking crisis 
the volume of production fell by an average of 15-20% of GDP. 




have negative consequences for other participants due to the 
interconnectedness which is the nature of financial markets. 
Steven Schwarcz  
(2008) 
The risk that the economic shock, such as the bankruptcy of a financial 
institution or a financial market collapse would lead to a chain of bankruptcies 
of financial firms or falling markets or significant damage to the entities 
financial system that negatively influence the cost of capital and its 
availability, as well as in most cases can lead to significant volatility in the 
financial markets. 
 
The opinion which is described in the Group 10 Report (2011) is shared by the 
International Monetary Fund, the Financial Stability Board, the Bank for 
International Settlements, and the European Systemic Risk Board. This is evidenced 
by the working documents of these organizations of 2009 - 2010, which emphasize 
the significant adverse impact of systemic risk on the economy real sector. The 
American (Dodd-Frank Act, 2010) and the UK (Financial Policy Committee of the 
Bank of England, HM Treasury, 2011) sources are focused on significant 
consequences for the financial sector and the risks to the financial stability of the 
country. 
 In any case, we can’t underestimate the impact of systemic risk, the important 
sources of which are (Baker D. and Travis McA. (2009), etc.): 
• herding bank behavior;  
• institutions tendency/ appetite to adopt excessively high risks (credit, market, 
liquidity) during the growth phase of the economic cycle;  
• availability of interbank financial linkages that are the source of the «contagion 
effect». 
 The research objectives.  
The main objectives requiring resolution are:  
- characteristics of systemic risk and systemically important banks;  
- defining the list of systemically important banks;  
- development of measures on their activities regulation. 
 Key research findings.  For systemic risk evaluation at present time quite a 
few approaches have been accumulated but they don’t approximate to the main goal - 
timely and objective assessment of systemic risk level. Stress tests do not allow 
making it qualitative either, because they use a limited range of stress causes. And the 
results of new research conducted by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
(e.g. «The systemic importance of financial institutions») suggest the existence of a 
nonlinear dependence between the size of the bank and its contribution to the 
systemic risk level. 
 Taking into consideration the existence of the above mentioned nonlinear 
relation between the bank size and its contribution to the level of systemic risk the 
problem of determining the list of systemically important banks (SIB) of the country 
and implementation of specific oversight and regulation for this category becomes 
particularly urgent. 
 Systemically important banks are the basis for systemically important financial 
institutions (except banks the insurance and investment companies, financial markets, 
infrastructure, etc. are included to SIFI).  But considering bank centralizing of our 
financial market the problem of SIB activities can spread to other sectors except 
banking and become the key problem of the economy. Thus, the possible 
consequences are as follows:  
 - the collapse of the financial and credit markets; 
 - pause of business activity in the overall economy, rising unemployment, 
reduced incomes, the  society destabilization. 
All these facts provide the particular importance to the regulation activity of 
SIBs. 
The bankruptcy problem for systemically important banks was faced long ago, 
there is even a concept that explains the rescue necessity of such large institutions - 
TBTF (to-big-to-fail). According to this concept the bankruptcy of a major bank 
could lead to a collapse of the entire financial system. But TBTF saving is expensive 
to taxpayers and leads to overall economic crisis deepening, loss of income, necessity 
to pass pension reforms and, at last, to frequency growth of crises. Moreover, the 
TBTF problem received continuation in the concept of moral hazard risk, as TBTF 
unfair behavior of adoption unreasonably high level of risk waiting for the state 
support. 
 Therefore, many practitioners and scientists see the solution of this problem 
only in the elimination of extremely large institutions. There are opposing points of 
view. Thus, on Paul Krugman opinion, during the Great Depression the collapse of 
the economy was due to a number of bankruptcies of small financial institutions. 
 Various documents of international organizations are devoted mainly to 
methods for determining global systemically important banks (Global Systemically 
Important Banks, G-SIBs), but there are those that highlight methods for national / 
domestic institutions (Domestic Systemically Important Banks, D-SIBs): «A 
framework for dealing with domestic systemically important banks» (BIS, 2012).  
 To determine the list of global systemically important banks by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (2012) is used a scoring approach; in particular, 
five criteria were taken into account: 
- the size of global systemically important banks; 
-  the interconnectedness of global systemically important banks;  
- cross-jurisdictional activity;  
-  substitutability; 
- complexity of operations.  
 Recommendations for the definition of systemically important domestic banks 
include all the above factors, except "cross- jurisdictional activities».  
Updated list of global systemically important banks is published on an annual 
basis.  
Measures being taken to SIFIs (banks, insurance companies, financial markets 
infrastructure objects) according to projects of international organizations consist of 4 
main directions: 
 1) the increasing of the intensity and effectiveness of the SIFIs control and 
supervision;   
 2) the effective insolvency arrangement without involving taxpayers' money;  
 3) introduction of additional requirements to SIFIs capital adequacy; 
 4) the stability increasing of systemically important objects of financial market 
infrastructure. 
 As a result of cluster analysis techniques by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision five groups of global systemically important banks were formed to 
establish the values of additional requirements to the value of their capital. Thus, the 
gradual "extension" value of additional requirements to the capital adequacy begins 
with 1% (the “lower” group), 1.5% (the second group), 2.0% (the third group), 2.5 
(the fourth group) to 3.5 % (the "upper" group, until empty) (BIS, 2012). 
In 2014 global SIFIs must fulfill the requirements for insolvency regulation 
planning. The results of their work in this area will be evaluated as a part of the 
Resolvability Assessment Process, RAP.  
 Additional requirements for capital adequacy of global SIFIs will be applied 
from 2014 (introduced gradually to 2019). G-SIFIs will also be obliged to comply 
with the increased requirements for risk management, data aggregation, risk control 
and internal control.  
 Regulators may establish specific requirements and limitations to SIBs (Table 
2):  
 Table 2 - Requirements and limitations that may be applied to SIBs 
The author, the source Requirements and limitations 
The Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve Bank 
(FRB) Richmond Jeffrey 
Leker  
SIBs should have less debentures and be less dependent on short-term 
loans; should raise capital if they are engaged in brokerage operations.  
In case of the collapse of any bank in the U.S. state refusal to participate 
in his salvation will be the best choice.  
The best protective measure against SIB collapse is to develop detailed 
plans for bankruptcy in case of problems. 
The Basel Committee 
recommendations 
(2012,2013) 
The need for systemically important credit institutions to create 
additional airbag in a reserve. 
Bank of Russia representatives (2013): For SIBs will be advised to bind 
at least 50% top executives bonuses to stock price.  
Typically, for SIB which has difficulties Bank of Russia starts actions 
for recovery, rather than liquidation. It is also possible to get state 
support in the crisis years. 
Some scientists and 
practices around the 
world 
SIBs in any case are on special account, both in terms of risk control and 
assessment of current activities - interest rates, capital adequacy, non-
performing loans. 
 Such organizations and institutions as Financial Stability Board, G- 20 group, 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the central banks of many 
countries pay attention to the supervision issue for systemically significant financial 
institutions.  
 In Ukraine there isn’t yet such structure as a systemic regulator (do not confuse 
with megaregulator; more detailed information about possible tasks of a systemic 
regulator you can find in Bielova article  (2014)) and there are no documented 
comprehensive measures for SIBs.  
 Similar situation is observed in our neighbors: Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan and others. Only in Russia 08.09.2013 it was decided to create from 
10.01.2013 the Supervision Department on systemically important institutions at the 
central office of Bank of Russia and supervisory activities will start from 01.10.2014. 
The purpose of the Department is the supervision centralization. The supervision 
functions transfer will be carried out gradually from regional offices to the newly 
created department. 
 Also, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia) has 
developed an approach to determine the list of Russian systemically important banks 
documented in the document «On determining the list of systemically important 
credit organizations" (2014). 
 There are other approaches, for example, employees of the National Bank of 
Belarus. Novikova V. (2013), Pashkevich A. and Vlasenko M. (2013) propose their 
approaches for determining the list of systemically important banks in their country, 
including such factors thresholds of which are given in brackets: 
 - the assets value (100% of total banking system assets); 
 - territorial network (200 outlets); 
 - the value of the deposit portfolio (10%);  
 - the value of the credit portfolio (10%);  
 - the importance of the bank (the bank can not be replaced);  
 - interdependence (≥ 50% of all banks have opened correspondent accounts in 
this bank).  
 It should be noted that it cannot be a single approach for all countries on SIB 
determining due to national specify, peculiarities of available statistical information 
and other differences. 
 Therefore, we used several approaches to determine the SIB:  
1) on the basis of the approach taken by Bank of Russia (2014);  
2) used data on the number of separate bank subdivisions according to the  
NABU site (NABU is Independent Association of the Banks of Ukraine);  
3) the proportion of the largest banks (five and twenty) in general indicators 
within the banking system in the country was determined.  
 After some calculations using data from the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) 
website and  Bank of Russia  approach (2014) we calculated the total indicators of the 
systemic importance of Ukrainian banks for the period of 1.01.2010-01.01.2014 and 
the average one for the last 3 years, as recommended in Bank of Russia  approach 
(2014). 
 The main results of the calculations are shown in Table 3:  
Table 3 – Total indicators of the systemic importance for the largest banks in Ukraine 
for the period of 01.01.2010 - 01.01.2014 (calculated on the basis of NBU site 
materials) 
Total indicators 





1 PRIVATBANK 11,34 12,32 13,30 15,31 16,27 14,30 
2 OSCHADBANK    6,06 5,87 6,47 7,43 9,38 7,29 
3 UKREXIMBANK 5,80 6,13 5,64 6,47 6,13 6,09 
4 RAIFFEISEN BANK 
AVAL 
6,20 5,57 4,40 3,88 2,91 4,19 
5 PROMINVESTBANK 4,48 4,08 3,50 4,15 3,55 3,82 
6 UKRSOTSBANK 4,47 4,07 3,45 3,27 3,05 3,46 
7 DELTA BANK 1,04 1,62 2,57 3,22 4,56 2,99 
8 UKRSIBBANK 4,85 4,78 2,97 1,96 1,55 2,82 
9 VTB BANK     2,94 3,20 3,24 2,90 1,95 2,82 
10 FIRST UKR. 
INTERNATIONAL 
BANK 
1,88 1,77 3,74 2,26 2,59 2,59 
11 ALFA-BANK 2,84 2,60 2,69 2,09 1,99 2,34 
12 NADRA 2,79 2,24 2,22 2,23 2,58 2,32 
13 UKRGAZBANK 1,95 2,21 2,41 2,57 2,04 2,31 
14 FINANCE AND 
CREDIT 
2,05 2,21 2,05 2,04 1,99 2,07 
15 SBERBANK OF 
RUSSIA 
0,78 1,13 1,48 2,44 2,93 1,99 
16 OTP BANK 2,23 1,84 1,50 1,36 1,12 1,45 
17 VAB BANK   0,89 0,72 1,21 1,18 1,89 1,25 
18 BANK CREDIT 
DNEPR 
1,00 1,03 1,24 1,65 0,70 1,16 
19 ERSTE BANK / 
FIDOBANK * 
1,03 1,03 1,04 0,65+0,4
8 
0,72 1,07 
20 PIVDENNYI 1,13 1,16 0,99 1,09 0,92 1,04 
Note*  
As of 01.01.13 "ERSTE BANK" and "FIDOBANK" were existed simultaneously, that’s why final 
indicators are given as the sum 
 
Thus, the list of systemically important banks is as follows: PRIVATBANK, 
OSCHADBANK, UKREXIMBANK, RAIFFEISEN BANK AVAL, 
PROMINVESTBANK, UKRSOTSBANK, DELTA BANK, UKRSIBBANK, VTB 
BANK, FIRST UKR.INTERNATIONAL BANK, ALFA-BANK, NADRA, 
UKRGAZBANK,FINANCE AND CREDIT, SBERBANK OF RUSSIA, OTP 
BANK, VAB BANK,  BANK CREDIT DNEPR, FIDOBANK, PIVDENNYI. 
 In all 20 banks for the last three years the total average indicator is > 1. 
The list has already excluded two major banks in which in the first quarter of 
2014 was introduced temporary administration - PJSC “BANK FORUM” and JSC 
“BROKBUSINESSBANK”.    
There are banks with an increase of total indicator and it shows their systemic 
importance: PRIVATBANK, OSCHADBANK, DELTA BANK, SBERBANK OF 
RUSSIA. But there are those for whom this indicator steadily decreases: 
RAIFFEISEN BANK AVAL, UKRSOTSBANK,UKRSIBBANK, ALFA-BANK, 
OTP BANK. 
Of course, the basis of SIBs form the banks of the first group but there are also 
banks of the second group (Table 4): 
Table 4 – Bank membership to a group of banks according to the NBU 
classification (compiled on the basis of NBU site materials)  
   01.01.10 01.01.11 01.01.12 01.01.13 01.01.14 
1 PRIVATBANK 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 
2 OSCHADBANK    1(2) 1(3) 1(3) 1(3) 1(2) 
3 UKREXIMBANK 1(3) 1(2) 1(2) 1(2) 1(3) 
4 RAIFFEISEN BANK AVAL 1(4) 1(4) 1(4) 1(4) 1(5) 
5 PROMINVESTBANK 1(7) 1(7) 1(6) 1(5) 1(7) 
6 UKRSOTSBANK 1(6) 1(6) 1(5) 1(6) 1(6) 
7 DELTA BANK 2(7) 2(1) 1(12) 1(8) 1(4) 
8 UKRSIBBANK 1(5) 1(5) 1(9) 1(12) 1(14) 
9 VTB BANK     1(9) 1(8) 1(7) 1(7) 1(13) 
10 
FIRST UKR.INTERNATIONAL 
BANK 1(14) 1(13) 1(8) 1(9) 1(9) 
11 ALFA-BANK 1(10) 1(9) 1(10) 1(13) 1(11) 
12 NADRA 1(11) 1(11) 1(11) 1(10) 1(10) 
13 UKRGAZBANK 2(1) 1(17) 1(16) 1(15) 1(15) 
14 FINANCE AND CREDIT 1(12) 1(12) 1(14) 1(14) 1(12) 
15 SBERBANK OF RUSSIA 2(12) 2(6) 1(17) 1(11) 1(8) 
16 OTP BANK 1(8) 1(10) 1(13) 2(1) 2(3) 
17 VAB BANK   2(9) 2(12) 2(7) 2(3) 2(2) 
18 BANK CREDIT DNEPR 2(18) 2(15) 2(9) 2(13) 2(20) 
19 ERSTE BANK + FIDOBANK 2(6) 2(7) 2(5) 2(14)+3(5) 2(6) 
20 PIVDENNYI 2(2) 2(4) 2(4) 2(8) 2(7) 
Note*  
The first figure is a group of banks; the second in brackets is the bank position in the corresponding 
group.  
 
The analysis of the number of bank subdivisions in Ukraine over the last year 
gives reason to certify that the abovementioned 20 banks have a share of 70% of the 
total number of subdivisions (Table 5). The numbers of subdivisions in other banks 
(there are almost 150) in addition to the abovementioned 20 banks are much lower 
ranging from 1 to 50.  
Table 5 - Dynamics of the number of bank subdivisions in Ukraine (based on NBU 
site materials) 
The numbers of 
subdivisions, units 
    01.01.13 01.01.14 
Change for 
the year 
1 PRIVATBANK 3405 3246 -159 
2 OSCHADBANK    5825 5530 -295 
3 UKREXIMBANK 126 124 -2 
4 RAIFFEISEN BANK AVAL 858 830 -28 
5 PROMINVESTBANK 99 81 -18 
6 UKRSOTSBANK 411 433 22 
7 DELTA BANK 130 244 114 
8 UKRSIBBANK 664 579 -85 
9 VTB BANK     126 129 3 
10 FIRST UKR.INTERNATIONAL BANK 160 161 1 
11 ALFA-BANK 94 97 3 
12 NADRA 545 522 -23 
13 UKRGAZBANK 234 238 4 
14 FINANCE AND CREDIT 321 330 9 
15 SBERBANK OF RUSSIA 161 211 50 
16 OTP BANK 147 138 -9 
17 VAB BANK   131 134 3 
18 BANK CREDIT DNEPR 91 81 -10 
19 ERSTE BANK + FIDOBANK 159 135 -24 
20 PIVDENNYI 162 162 0 
  The total number of 20 first banks 13849 13405 -444 
  Total in the system 19860 19452 -408 
  Share of the first 20 banks 0,70 0,69 Х 
The data on the number of banking subdivisions only confirm the validity of 
the abovementioned list of 20 banks.  
Finally, we define the share of the largest banks in the synthesis rate of the 
system (Table 6):  
Table 6 - Indicators of the largest banks in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus and 
Russia as of 01.01.2014 (based on the data: The National Bank of Kazakhstan, 
National Bank of The Republic of Belarus, National Bank of Ukraine, Bank of 
Russia) 














The share by assets, % 41,6 73,2 54,5 79 52,7 71,6 
The share by capital, % 43,2 71,9 54,1 76 49,7 68,3 
The share by the loans sum and 
other assets with credit risk, % 39,7 74,2 61,5 81 55,7 74,6 
The share by the number of 
branches in the country, % 55 69 … … 14 23 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(by assets) 552 853 2148 1021 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(by capital) 499 902 2144 1123 
 
 In general, the share of the largest banks in Ukraine corresponds to similar 
indicators in Russia and Kazakhstan. And for Belarus the larger concentration is 
typical among those countries indicated in Table 6. 
 Thus, the abovementioned list of 20 banks is the enumeration of Ukrainian 
SIBs and this list is obtained using the three approaches and can be used for the 
purposes of banking supervision and regulation. 
 Conclusions and recommendations for further research. 
 Firstly, a set of three following approaches for determination the list of SIBs 
allows updating it annually according to dynamic changes in the banking sector.
 Secondly, the creation of systemic regulator which deals with the issue of 
measures, restrictions and requirements for SIBs and other aspects of systemic risks 
requires the solution of the matter.  
 Thirdly, the increased demands on the SIBs should be installed regarding the 
quality and capital adequacy, the quality of risk management (credit, etc.)  and also 
requires the practice implementation of periodic stress tests with gradual expansion / 
renewal the list of stress factors according to changes that will take place. 
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